?asOf= parameter to see the current catalog state.Mandatory reporting based on training-compute or capability thresholds.
Neutral reference · topicScopeSourcesRecorded catalog review: not recorded
Definition & scope
The table covers 45 selected documents. The catalogue records 7 as not addressing this topic; 22 have no classification recorded. These are different states. Neither establishes an absence of law across a jurisdiction.
Coverage across jurisdictions
Historical primacy & cross-jurisdiction tension
First addressed by DFARS Subpart 252.204 (Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting) on (implicit). This is the earliest matching document in the selected catalogue, not a finding about the first law worldwide or the influence of this document on others.
- Forum-shoppingEU AI Act↔Executive Order 14179 — Removing Barriers to American Leadership in AI
- Forum-shoppingExecutive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, Trustworthy AI↔UK Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation (White Paper)
- Forum-shoppingCalifornia SB-1047: Safe and Secure Innovation for Frontier AI Models Act↔Interim Measures for Generative AI Service Management
Compare jurisdictions: EU vs US · EU vs UK · EU vs CN
Enforcement & impact
Documents recorded as not addressing this topic
These selected documents have an explicit “silent” classification. This does not establish a jurisdiction-wide legal gap. Documents without a classification are identified separately in the table.
- UK Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation (White Paper)UK
- Interim Measures for Generative AI Service ManagementCN
- G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of ConductG7
- OECD AI Principles (Recommendation)OECD
- Council of Europe Framework Convention on AIcouncil_of_europe
- UN GA Resolution on Safe, Secure, Trustworthy AIUN
- NIST AI Risk Management FrameworkUS
See also
Further reading
25 academic & grey-literature sources bearing on this topic — catalogued metadata with a primary link; one-line findings are ✦ AI-generated summaries, labeled as such (charter §7.9). Browse the full literature index.
- Defending Compute Thresholds Against Legal Loopholes Preprint✦ AIIdentifies 'enhancement techniques that are capable of decreasing training compute usage while preserving... model capabilities', exposing loopholes in compute-reporting thresholds.
- Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence Preprint✦ AIArgues compute is a uniquely governable lever because it is "detectable, excludable, and quantifiable, and is produced via an extremely concentrated supply chain".
- Training Compute Thresholds: Features and Functions in AI Regulation Preprint✦ AIFinds "training compute currently is the most suitable metric to identify GPAI models", but thresholds should only trigger further scrutiny, not determine risk measures alone.
- Compute North vs. Compute South: The Uneven Possibilities of Compute-based AI Governance Around the Globe Peer-reviewed✦ AICensus of hyperscale cloud regions shows a divide between "Compute North" states hosting training-relevant compute and a Compute South, shaping who can wield compute-based governance.
- Governing Through the Cloud: The Intermediary Role of Compute Providers in AI Regulation Preprint✦ AIArgues 'compute providers should have legal obligations' to secure infrastructure, keep records, verify activity and report frontier training as regulatory intermediaries.
- Verification methods for international AI agreements Preprint✦ AISurveys '10 verification methods that could detect... unauthorized AI training... and unauthorized data centers', mapping the technical basis for compute-disclosure regimes.
- Open Problems in Technical AI Governance Preprint✦ AICatalogs open problems in 'technical analysis and tools for supporting the effective governance of AI', including compute measurement, verification and reporting gaps.
- What does it take to catch a Chinchilla? Verifying Rules on Large-Scale Neural Network Training via Compute Monitoring Preprint✦ AIProposes chip-level monitoring (on-chip logging, supply-chain oversight) giving governments "high confidence that no actor uses large quantities of specialized ML chips" in violation of rules.
- Oversight for Frontier AI through a Know-Your-Customer Scheme for Compute Providers Preprint✦ AIProposes a banking-style KYC regime for cloud compute providers because 'compute is emerging as a node for oversight', enabling record-keeping and reporting of high-risk training.
- Deceptive Alignment PreprintHubinger, E., et al. (2019), 'Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems.'
- Mesa-Optimization PreprintHubinger, E., et al. (2019), 'Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systems.'
- Capability Elicitation PreprintQi, X., Zeng, Y., Xie, T., Chen, P.-Y., Jia, R., Mittal, P., Henderson, P. (2023), 'Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!'
- Policy Instrument Peer-reviewedLascoumes, P. & Le Galès, P. (2007). Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments — From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation. Governance 20(1): 1-21. See also Hood (1983) The Tools of Government, ch. 1-2; Salamon (2002) The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, pp. 1-47; Howlett (2011) Designing Public Policies, ch. 3-5.
- Multi-Turn Evaluation PreprintZheng, L., et al. (2023), 'Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena' — operationalises the multi-turn evaluation protocol for foundation models.
- Model Distillation Risk PreprintHinton, G., Vinyals, O., Dean, J. (2015), 'Distilling the Knowledge in a Neural Network' — the foundational distillation paper; the governance-relevant adaptation runs through Alpaca/Vicuna (2023) and DeepSeek-R1 (2025).
- Inference-Time Compute PreprintSnell, C., Lee, J., Xu, K., Kumar, A. (2024), 'Scaling LLM Test-Time Compute Optimally can be More Effective than Scaling Model Parameters' — establishes inference-time-compute scaling as a first-class capability lever.
- Sandbagging Preprintvan der Weij, T., Hofstätter, F., Jaffe, O., Brown, S., Ward, F. (2024), 'AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluations.'
- In-Context Learning PreprintBrown, T., et al. (2020), 'Language Models are Few-Shot Learners' (GPT-3 paper) — the canonical articulation of in-context learning as an emergent capability.
- AI Risk Management Framework | NIST Standards body✦ AIUS voluntary AI risk-management framework (Govern/Map/Measure/Manage).
- ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 - Artificial intelligence Standards body✦ AIInternational committee developing AI standards.
- OECD AI Incidents Monitor, an evidence base for trustworthy AI - OECD.AI Incident database✦ AIOECD tracker of real-world AI incidents and hazards.
- Capturing the Potential of Generative AI’s Use in Health and Medicine Requires Collaboration and Oversight, Consideration of Risks, Says NAM Special Publication Research institute✦ AINAM special publication on generative AI in health & medicine.
- One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence (AI100) Research institute✦ AIStanford's standing century-long study of AI's societal impact.
- Measuring up | Ada Lovelace Institute Civil society✦ AIAda Lovelace Institute policy briefing.
- Anthropomorphic AI terms create gaps in accountability | Brookings Think tank✦ AICommentary on how anthropomorphic AI language obscures accountability.
References
The primary instrument sources behind the article's classifications.
- EU-AIA-2024: Art. 51(2) + Annex XIII (10²⁵ FLOP presumption)
- US-EO-14110: §4.2(a)(i) — 10²⁶ FLOP threshold
- UK-WHITEPAPER-2023: Voluntary AISI testing instead; no statutory reporting
- CN-GENAI-2023: Service-deployment trigger, not compute
- G7-HIROSHIMA: Voluntary self-reporting only
- OECD-AI-PRIN: Not addressed
- COE-AI-CONV: Not addressed
- UN-RES-2024: Not addressed
- NIST-AI-RMF: Framework is voluntary; EO did the reporting
- BLETCHLEY-2023: Declaration §6 calls for capability evaluation but does not specify compute thresholds
- SEOUL-2024: Safety Commitments invoke capability thresholds; compute is one proxy
- CA-SB-1047: Cal. SB-1047 §22603(b) — annual reporting of training compute + safety determination
- ANTHROPIC-RSP-2024: RSP v2 capability evaluations triggered by capability rather than pure compute; compute is one signal
- OPENAI-PREPAREDNESS-2023: Capability-tier evaluations are the primary trigger; compute is a coincident signal
- WH-VOLUNTARY-2023: Self-reporting through commitments framework; binding compute thresholds came via EO 14110 §4.2(a)
- OMB-M-24-10: §3(a)(iv)–(v) annual public AI use-case inventory + quarterly AI procurement reporting to OMB
- GSA-AI-GUIDE-2024: Guide routes AI acquisitions through existing governmentwide vehicles (MAS IT / Best-in-Class GWACs) rather than a dedicated generative-AI vehicle or new AI-specific SINs
- DOD-RAI-2022: Tenet 1 (RAI Governance) + Tenet 3 (Acquisition Lifecycle) — clarifies CDAO + OUSD(A&S) roles in AI procurement oversight; tracking + reporting emerge through standard DoD acquisition reporting channels
- FEDRAMP-AI-2024: FedRAMP authorisation enables ATO; agency-AI-use disclosure flows through OMB M-24-10 inventory + quarterly procurement reporting rather than through FedRAMP itself
- DFARS-252-204: Cyber-incident reporting under 252.204-7012(c) — 72-hour DoD notification covers AI-system compromise events including model-weight theft + prompt-injection-based credential exposure; broader AI-use disclosure flows through M-24-10 not DFARS
- CA-SB-53: Bus. & Prof. Code § 22757.11 uses a 10^26 FLOP compute threshold to SCOPE the regulated class + § 22757.12 ties disclosure to compute-defined frontier models; no standalone compute-figure reporting mandate to a regulator
- NY-RAISE-2025: N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 1420(6),(9) — the frontier-model / large-developer compute figures SCOPE the regulated class; no standalone compute-figure reporting duty to a regulator. (The Mar. 27, 2026 chapter amendment revised the large-developer threshold to align more closely with California's criteria; the verdict — coverage-scoping, not a reporting duty — is unchanged by the specific figure.)
- JP-AIPROMO-2025: Act No. 53 of 2025, Art. 12
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